Talk politics.

If the US foreign policy in the Bushonian years looked kind of like a cowboy riding a crazed mare in wild gallop and shooting in all directions, the guns must've been tucked back into their holsters during Obama's tenure, and the horse is barely dragging her feet in the dirt. "The world is disorganized and the superpower is not taking the lead", Nobel peace prize laureate and famous Polish dissident Lech Walesa recently summarized the situation. The US friends are not hiding their concerns because of this development. Which is why Obama's visit in Europe was viewed like a demonstration that America hasn't abandoned East Europe. That's also the reason why the Polish president Komorowski met Obama at the imposing background of three US F16 fighter jets at the Warsaw airport.


Poland and the Baltic states are loudly proclaiming their fears that Russia's appetite might not end with Crimea's annexation and the turmoil in East Ukraine. So Warsaw insists on a stronger NATO presence in the region. But America seems alarmingly hesitant and detached on this issue. Obama's visit to Europe, along with his speech at West Point from a few days ago, were somehow supposed to disperse the doubts and breathe new confidence into the wary US allies, especially those on NATO's eastern flank.

The general message from Obama's visit, especially in Poland and the region (he then went to Brussels, btw), is that the US guarantees the region's security and takes the Ukraine crisis seriously enough.

For the first time since 1964 though, more than half of the Americans (52%) agree that the US should mind their own business, pursue their own narrow interests at the international scene, and leave the other countries to sort their problems between themselves, a 2013 Pew Research Centre survey indicates. What's more, 80% agree that America shouldn't be thinking so much internationally, but should focus on its national problems instead. Behind those numbers there's a fatigue from the two wars that Bush started and which Obama inherited and had to somehow bring to a conclusion. Obviously, Americans don't want any more adventures overseas and they prefer a more passive stance. But the shrinking activity on the international stage is inevitably creating a air of indecisiveness and uncertainty around Obama (which his political opponents at home are more than eager to exploit at any given opportunity).

When Assad used chemical weapons against his people last fall, all eyes were on the POTUS. A year earlier he had drawn a clear "red line" and warned that if Assad crossed it there'd be serious consequences. Once he did, expectations varied: from establishing a no-fly zone, to sending military equipment to the rebels, to delivering pointed hits on various military facilities of the Syrian regime. Being pressed by public opinion, Obama hesitated for too long as to what should be done, and he was eventually compelled to accept a compromise scenario that was proposed by Putin. Assad promised to quit his chemical weapons, he avoided international intervention, and had his hands untied to keep killing rebels with conventional means - and a few days ago he was re-elected in a landslide, and now he seems more untouchable than ever.

After this episode, the confidence that the US would deliver on its commitments was shaken. When Russia went even further with annexing Crimea and violated the 1994 agreement for Ukraine's territorial integrity (signed by Russia, Britain, the US and Ukraine), the response was again disapointing. There were indeed a few levels of Western economic sanctions, which so far have failed to achieve a deterring effect, but have intensified Russia's partnership with China instead. And since the Ukraine crisis has not ended with Crimea as some naive minds were initially hoping, there's an increasing sense of imminent threat creeping across Europe. So Obama was supposed to try restore the trust of America's trans-Atlantic allies.


The people from Obama's closest circle in the White House like national security advisor Ben Rhodes had long been preparing the media for the president's West Point speech. It was advertised as an exposee of his foreign policy doctrine. It was supposed to simultaneously shut the mouths of his domestic critics who are yelling that he's not protecting the US interests enough, as well as calm down the international concerns that the US is reverting to all-out withdrawal and self-isolationism. Obama's main message was that America will no longer be using military force overseas, except in case of immediate territorial and physical threat. In all other situations international cooperation would be preferred. In other words, local problems ought to be tackled with local forces. Which does make sense, from a certain perspective.

In a way, the speech matched the moods both on the left and right. Now a more cautious approach to using US power is being sought. That doesn't mean this force won't be used at all. The president tried to explain that, but people who expect sharper actions must've definitely remained disappoinetd anyway.

The main criticism to Obama is again about hesitation. Despite the big expectations, the speech contained almost no specifics. The famous Pivot to Asia concept was only mentioned twice, and much more time and words was dedicated to the war on terror - some rhetoric that's more familair from W's time. That moment was a good opportunity for Obama to explain why Asia will be as important to America in the next decade as terrorism was in the previous one.

But Obama's only specific proposal was about the creation of a 5 billion dollar fund that'd be used for enhancing the counter-terrorism capacities of America's allies in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere around the world. US experts will be training the local forces, rather than directly participating in military actions. Which is much cheaper than all-out war, and in many cases more efficient - not to mention how less damaging for America's image it could be, if implemented properly. Especially if those banner-wrapped coffins stop pouring in.

It's true that America does need a strategy that'd more adequately respond to this more dispersed threat to its national security and its interests. A strategy that would expand the US scope without necessarily using military forces and thus causing discontent and hatred among the local population. That was basically Obama's sentiment. He's talking of military aid much along the lines of the Malian and Chadian example (failed or not). In Nigeria for example, special units of the US military are training local forces for countering terrorist organizations like Boko Haram, the one that kidnapped those girls in the northern part of the country.

Obama's administration wants to show that the existing commitments will be adjusted to the specific threats that manifestate themselves in different ways in the different corners of the world. There's a whole set of non-conventional challenges, like the human trafficking routes, piracy, etc, that are either directly or indirectly related to terrorism. This doesn't mean the US is withdrawing from its commitments; it means the US is adopting a different approach and relying more on shared responsibility - something that many around the world used to criticize Bush for not doing enough (or at all).

But in Europe, threats of the armed terrorism sort are not the main concern. That's why the message about more cooperation and less US intervention had to be expanded and delivered on a separate tour around the place, starting with America's staunchest ally, Poland.

So the two speeches, the one at West Point and then the one in Warsaw, are directly related. Obama not only confirmed NATO's significance, but also spoke of the support for Poland and other countries in the region. Interestingly, he also urged those countries to increase their defense budgets and do more contribution to NATO. That wasn't just a call for Poland but for the rest, to show that they're strong allies who can be relied upon.

Obama told the Poles that America's obligations to Poland's security and that of their Central and East European allies are a cornerstone to America's own security. He reiterated that Russia's actions in Ukraine constituted direct aggression, and reminded of Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which says that an attack on any member means attack on all members. Whether he truly means that or is just throwing some words in the air to make people feel warm and fuzzy, is a matter of time to find out, IMO.

His statements were supported with a commitment to the creation of a 1 billion dollar fund that'll be used for joint training of NATO forces in East Europe. This support comes after a few US F15 and F16 fighter jets were already deployed to Poland and the Baltic states in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, and some new warships were sent to the Black Sea. The purpose of all this military presence, along with Obama's sharper rhetoric, is not just to deter Russia, but probably even more importantly, to calm down America's allies.

The events in Ukraine, especially the Crimean annexation, are definitely a new chapter in Europe's post-war history. Those were outright violations of international law. Once more, for the second time after Georgia, Russia is testing Europe's security system and probing where its limits are. Which is why Poland and other countries in the region feel that they need better planning and firmer support. They're aware that they have to be more prepared than a year or two ago. Because Putin has made it very clear that Russia cannot be trusted to be a safe and predictable player in that part of the world.

After Warsaw, Obama went to the G7 meeting in Brussles, where he gave Putin a 4-week deadline to change Russia's course of action, or face new sanctions. Exactly how less half-assed than the previous ones those would be, is yet to be seen. From the standpoint of the goals of Obama's trip to Europe, at least one half of those were met, after all. Indeed, what was promised was less than what Poland had been hoping for (they insist on permanent military NATO presence in East Europe). But in order to give them what they want, first Germany's opposition to the idea would have to be overcome. The Germans still consider the deployment of alliance troops in that part of the continent a unnecessary provocation to Russia. As if Russia cares about the presence of absence of provocations anyway.


All that said, giving Europe more confidence should be happening at a fundamental level. Things like sending troops might or might not be technically necessary, but that's not as important as, for example, making compromises with EU on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement. And also intensifying the two-way communication and exchange of ideas between the American and European side about what should be happening next. In fact, Putin may've revived America's interest to East Europe, which had started waning in recent times, and that could be a good thing (or not - if you ask the Serbs, or the OMG-Soros conspiracy theorists).

No one expects things to return to what they used to be at the time when the US presence in the region was at its peak and was viewed as something normal, and the meme that Poland is the most pro-American country in the world (even more than America itself) was born. But, since America continues to hold the key to Europe's security (including because the European leaders have always preferred to let the US do the dirty military job for them), the renewed commitment in that respect is more than welcome. At least until the EU comes up with its own security doctrine, instead of carefully reading what the US one means for Europe.